Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption: Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians

Eric Avis, Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability. It does so in the context of Brazil’s anti-corruption program, which randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds. It finds that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent. This paper interprets these reduced-form findings through a political agency model, which it structurally estimates. [Working Paper 22443]

Keywords: Government Audit; Corruption; Corrupt Politicians; public resources; Brazil’s anti-corruption program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
Note: Institutional Papers
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians (2018)
Working Paper: Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians (2016)
Working Paper: Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians (2016)
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