Traditional Procurement versus Publicâ€“Private Partnership: A Comparison of Procurement Modalities Focusing on Bundling Contract Effects
Hojun Lee and
Working Papers from eSocialSciences
This paper studies the optimal structure of procurement contracts between public and private sectors by mainly comparing two typical procurement types: traditional procurement and publicâ€“private partnership (PPP). It first sets up a principalâ€“agent model focusing on bundling effects of procurement based on Hart (2003), and Iossa and Martimort (2015) to see under which conditions PPP has advantages over traditional procurement and vice versa. Then, it considers if the Republic of Koreaâ€™s PPP structure in practice is well designed to maximize efficiency regarding the theoretical model. By reviewing the data on major investors and equity transactions of the Republic of Koreaâ€™s PPP projects, it also shows that the bundling effects of PPP contracts, which is one of the main sources of efficiency, is limited under the current economic and political environment and derive policy implications for developing countries implementing PPP projects in the region.
Keywords: eSS; traditional procurement; Publicâ€“Private Partnership (PPP); procurement contracts; public sector; private sector; principalâ€“agent; Republic of Korea; economic; environment; political; policy implication; PPP projects. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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