Optimal Patent Length in a North-South Framework

Swapnendu Banerjee (Bandyopadhyay) and Tarun Kabiraj

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: Under certain conditions it is optimal for the noninnovating south to give patent protection for a longer time period than the innovating north. A cooperative patent agreement involves a larger protection by each country compared to the non-cooperative situation. [WP 9].

Keywords: south; north; non-innovating; cooperative; protection; country; patent; TRIPS; trade; GATT; Pareto improvement; Intellectual Property Rights (IPR); innovations; endogenous; welfare; R&D firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
Note: Institutional Papers
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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