On The Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules

Ram Singh ()

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: The first objective of this paper is to contribute to the debate regarding the desirability of the sharing of liability for the accident loss. The second objective is to extend the efficiency analysis beyond Shavell (1980, 1987) and Miceli (1997), to search for the second-best liability rules. [WP no. 150].

Keywords: economic anlaysis; Liability rules; negligence liability; comparative liability; accident loss; loss sharing; social welfare; first best; second best; Nash equilibrium; incentives; probability; motor vehicle; victim (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
Note: Institutional Papers
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules (2006)
Working Paper: On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules (2006)
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