Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance

Frederico Finan and Claudio Ferraz

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: Using exogenous variation in the salaries of local legislators across Brazil’s municipal governments this paper examines whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and improve political performance. The analysis exploits discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional amendment defining caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal population.

Keywords: Brazil; municipal; population; salary; politicians; wages; political performance; constitutional amendment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Note: Institutional Papers
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (142)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance (2009)
Working Paper: Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1889

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