Political Selection and the Quality of Evidence: Evidence form South India
Timothy Besley () and
Working Papers from eSocialSciences
This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics aÂ®ect politician behavior while in oÂ±ce. Education increases the chances of selection to public oÂ±ce and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not aÂ®ect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alters the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information Â°ows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.
Keywords: governance; South India; politicians; Political Economy; Political Science (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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