The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation

Ram Singh () and Francesco Parisi

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: Comparative causation is the only tort regime that allows parties to share an accident loss in equilibrium. The sharing of an accident loss between a nonnegligent injurer and his nonnegligent victim spreads activity level and R&D incentives between prospective tortfeasors and their victims. This is an e ffect that is never observed under the other negligence and strict liability based regimes. In spite of these interesting attributes, the existing literature left open the question as to whether loss sharing was able to maintain optimal care incentives for both parties. In this paper, we address this unresolved issue in the literature, considering the effeciency of loss-sharing under comparative causation. [Working Paper No. 179]

Keywords: torts; loss-sharing; negligence; strict liability; comparative causation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
Note: Institutional Papers
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.esocialsciences.org/Download/repecDownl ... &AId=2681&fref=repec

Related works:
Journal Article: The Efficiency of Comparative Causation (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2681

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from eSocialSciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Padma Prakash ().