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MULTI-MARKET COLLUSION WITH TERRITORIAL ALLOCATION

Aditya Bhattacharjea ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Uday Bhanu Sinha ()

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: This paper develops a super game model of collusion between price-setting oligopolists located in different markets separated by trade costs. The firms produce a homogenous good and sustain collusion based on territorial allocation of markets. We first show, in a more general framework than some earlier literature, that a reduction in trade costs can paradoxically increase the sustainability of collusion. Then we prove a new paradox where the scope for collusion may be enhanced by an increase in the number of firms. We discuss several implications for trade and antitrust policy in this context. [Working Paper No. 217]

Keywords: Multi-market contact; collusion; trade costs; territorial allocation; cartels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
Note: Institutional Papers
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Related works:
Journal Article: Multi-market collusion with territorial allocation (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Multi-market Collusion with Territorial Allocation (2012) Downloads
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