Quality Healthcare and Health Insurance Retention: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in the Kolkata Slums

Clara Delavallade

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: Healthcare in developing countries is often unreliable and of poor quality, thus reducing individuals incentives to use quality health services. This paper examines an innovative approach to access to and demand for quality health care from the poor. Using data from a field experiment in India, the impact of high-quality care experiences in the form of a free medical consultation with a qualified nongovernmental organization doctor is randomly offered by a health insurance provider to a subset of its enrollees. [IFPRI Discussion Paper 01352].

Keywords: Kolkata Slums; Quality Healthcare; developing countries; incentives; India; medical consultation; nongovernmental organization; doctor; Health Insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06
Note: Institutional Papers
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.esocialsciences.org/Download/repecDownl ... &AId=5916&fref=repec

Related works:
Working Paper: Quality Healthcare and Health Insurance Retention: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in the Kolkata Slums (2015)
Working Paper: Quality healthcare and health insurance retention: Evidence from a randomized experiment in the Kolkata slums (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:5916

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from eSocialSciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Padma Prakash ().