Does Introduction of Bureaucratic Competition Reduce Corruption in Public Service Delivery?

Vivekananda Mukherjee and Panchali Banerjee

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: The paper theoretically explores the impact of introducing bureaucratic competition on corruption. For this purpose it considers three different measures of corruption such as corruption incidence (CI), relative corruption incidence (CRI) and corruption rents (CR) in two different types of economies namely corruption-tolerant economies and corruption-reliant economies.

Keywords: Corruption; competition; bureaucracy; red tape; measures of corruption; extortion; collusion; India; Public Economics; Public Service Delivery; Development; Growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
Note: Institutional Papers
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Working Paper: Does Introduction of Bureaucratic Competition Reduce Corruption in Public Service Delivery? (2015)
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