Whose Side Are You On? Identifying The Distributive Preferences of Local Politicians in India

Mark Schneider and Neelanjan Sircar

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: The literature on decentralized public programs suggests that errors in the targeting of anti-poverty programs are rooted in the capture of these programs by local elites or local politicians. Consistent with the literature on moral economy in political science and experimental economics, we argue that voters in contexts of rural poverty prefer local leaders who target subsistence benefits to the poor. In a high information village context, where voters and leaders know each other, we argue that local elections lead to the selection of local leaders with pro-poor preferences over the distribution of these benefits. We show this with a novel theory of local politicians’ social preferences.

Keywords: public programs; decentralized; anti-poverty programs; local elites; politicians; literature; moral economy; political science; rural poverty; high information village; voters; leaders; local elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
Note: Institutional Papers
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