High and Low Activity Spell in Housing Markets

Eric Smith

Economics Discussion Papers from University of Essex, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper demonstrates the way in which stock-flow matching with endogenous seller entry generates hot and cold spells in house sales. Potential sellers know the number of bidders remaining from the last house sale. If two or more bidders remain, the seller obtains the gains to trade through competitive bidding. The market is active. With one monopolistic bidder, the buyer captures the surplus and sellers become unwilling to enter. The market remains dormant until sellers think enough time has passed for buyer entry to have replenished the market and make entry profitable. The resulting pattern of trade matches up with observations from Wisconsin.

Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repository.essex.ac.uk/15620/ original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: High and Low Activity Spells in Housing Markets (2020)
Working Paper: High and Low Activity Spells in Housing Markets (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esx:essedp:15620

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Discussion Papers Administrator, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Discussion Papers from University of Essex, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Essex Economics Web Manager ().