A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights

Abhinay Muthoo

Economics Discussion Papers from University of Essex, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analyses explores, in particular, the roles of the players’ fighting and productive skills on the emergence and security (or otherwise) of this property right

Keywords: property rights; state-of-nature; natural equilibrium; self-enforcement; inter-player transfers of output; incentive-compatible agreements. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Journal Article: A model of the origins of basic property rights (2004)
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