A Note on Corruption and Public Investment: The Political Instability Threshold

Frank Bohn

Economics Discussion Papers from University of Essex, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the government’s public investment decision problem. Above some critical value of political instability, no investment is optimal. The result can also be interpreted as an alternative explanation for some governments’ reluctance in fighting corruption.

Keywords: political instability; myopic behavior; public investment; corruption; transition and developing countries. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Working Paper: A Note On Corruption And Public Investment: The Political Instability Threshold (2004)
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