Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment

V Bhaskar

Economics Discussion Papers from University of Essex, Department of Economics

Abstract: Bagwell (1995) argues that commitment in undermined by the slightest imperfectness in observation. Guth, Ritzberger & Kirchsteiger (1998) question this assertion: for any finite leader-follower game, with arbitrary many players in each role and generic payoffs, they show that there always exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that is accessible, i.e. it can be approximated by the outcome of a mixed equilibrium of the game with imperfect observation. We show that accessibility fails in a class of games played in economic environments, where the payoffs to commitment actions depend upon prices set by other agents, prices being chosen from a continuum. Accessibility requires either that commitment is not required or that the price setting agents have no monopoly power. Our result follows from a generalized indifference principle which mixed strategies must satisfy in such economic environments.

Keywords: imperfect observation; mixed strategies. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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