An Evolutionary Game Approach to the Issues of Migration, Nationalism, Assimilation and Enclaves

André Barreira da Silva Rocha ()

Economics Discussion Papers from University of Essex, Department of Economics

Abstract: I use evolutionary game theory to address the relation between nationalism and immigration, studying how two different populations in a country, one composed of national citizens and the other of immigrants, evolve over time. Both populations depart from some polymorphic initial state. A national citizen may behave either nationalistically or may welcome immigrants. Immigrants may have an interest in learning the host country language or not. I also account for the presence of enclaves, which make the immigrants’ own population effects important. The results show that six types of evolutionary equilibria are possible, although they never co-exist in the state space. A low cost of learning the host country language leads to complete assimilation of immigrants over time. Enclaves make assimilation a less competitive strategy. A high cost of learning may lead to peaceful multiculturalism or to political instability depending on the ability of policy makers to prevent nationalistic attitudes.

Keywords: Evolutionary games; replicator dynamics; migration; nationalism; enclaves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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