Design of public procurement auctions: Evidence from cleaning contracts

Ari Hyytinen, Sofia Lundberg and Otto Toivanen

No 483670, Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: We compare beauty contests with first-price sealed-bid and scoring auctions, using data on public procurement of cleaning services in Swedish municipalities. The lowest submitted and winning bids are similar in all auction designs despite a higher price sensitivity of procurement bureaucrats in scoring (and first-price) auctions. There is more entry in beauty contests, by firms favored in them. Reduced entry into the scoring and price only auctions largely explains why the procurement costs are not lowered compared to beauty contests.

Keywords: public procurement; auction design; entry; beauty contests; scoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-02
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Published in FEB Research Report MSI_1503

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https://lirias.kuleuven.be/retrieve/302697 MSI Working Paper (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Design of public procurement auctions: evidence from cleaning contracts (2018)
Working Paper: Design of public procurement auctions: Evidence from cleaning contracts (2018)
Working Paper: Design of Public Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Cleaning Contracts (2016)
Working Paper: Design of public procurement auctions: Evidence from cleaning contracts (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:483670

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