Are NIMBY'S commuters?

Bert Saveyn

No 500306, Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: This paper considers a metropolitan area where residents can commute between several jurisdictions. These residents show NIMBY behavior (Not-In-My-Backyard). They try to preserve their living quality by pushing the polluting economic activity to the neighboring jurisdictions and keep their labor income as commuters. This induces a race-to-the-top among jurisdictions. Fiercer competition due to a higher number of jurisdictions intensifies this race-to-the-top; whereas commuting costs, pollution taxes, payroll taxes and bigger jurisdictions increase the incentive for more pollution.

Date: 2006
Note: paper number ETE WP 2006-04
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Published in Working Papers, pages 1-52

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Related works:
Working Paper: Are NIMBY'S commuters? (2006)
Working Paper: Are NIMBY's commuters? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:500306

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