Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments versus Reserves

Sandra Rousseau

No 543599, Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behavior to change over time. A distinction is made between initial and continuing compliance. We find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement can have a significant impact on the choice between subsidy schemes and reserves for conservation policies. The results suggest that it is useless to design a conservation scheme for landholders, if the regulator is not prepared to explicitly back the program with a monitoring and enforcement policy. In general, the regulator will prefer to use compensation payments, if the cost of using government revenues is sufficiently low, the environmental benefits are equal, and the cost efficiency benefits exceed the (possible) increase in inspection costs. If the use of government funds is too costly, the reserve-type instruments will be socially beneficial.

Keywords: Monitoring and enforcement; Policy instruments; Conservation policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: paper number ETE WP 2008-01
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Published in Working Papers, pages 1-34

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Related works:
Working Paper: Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments versus Reserves (2008)
Working Paper: Enforcement aspects of conservation policies: compensation payments versus reserves (2008)
Working Paper: Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments versus Reserves (2008)
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