Physical and Financial Virtual Power Plants

Bert Willems

Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: Regulators in Belgium and the Netherlands use different mechanisms to mitigate generation market power. In Belgium, antitrust authorities oblige the incumbent to sell financial Virtual Power Plants, while in the Netherlands regulators have been discussing the use of physical Virtual Power Plants. This paper uses a numerical game theoretic model to stimulate the behaviour of the generation firms and to compare the effects of both systems on the market power of the generators. It shows that financial Virtual Power Plants are better for society.

Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0512

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