Learning about compliance under asymmetric information

Carmen Arguedas and Sandra Rousseau

Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms that cause harmful externalities. This information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future, since inspections can be influenced by firms' past performance relative to other competitors in the market. If a firm is less successful than it peers in reducing the externality, if faces the risk of being targeted for increased inspections in the next period This risk of stricter monitoring might induce high cost firms to mimic low cost firms, while the latter might try to avoid being mimicked We show that under certain circumstances, mimicking, or even the threat of mimicking, might reduce socially harmful activities and thus be welfare improving.

Keywords: monitoring and enforcement; externalities; learning; mimicking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H83 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Related works:
Journal Article: Learning about compliance under asymmetric information (2012)
Working Paper: Learning about compliance under asymmetric information (2008)
Working Paper: Learning about compliance under asymmetric information (2008)
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