Legislative Process with Open Rules

Theresa Fahrenberger () and Hans Gersbach
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Theresa Fahrenberger: Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich

No 07/64, CER-ETH Economics working paper series from CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich

Abstract: We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs.

Keywords: Baron/Ferejohn model; bargaining in legislatures; open rules; threegroup and four-group equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Legislative Process with Open Rules (2007)
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