Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information

Volker Hahn

No 10/136, CER-ETH Economics working paper series from CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich

Abstract: We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this case, silence is telling and undermines the prevailing view over time if this view is incorrect. As a result, withholding arguments about the correct state of the world is only a temporary phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts becomes large. For small groups, a simple mechanism the principal can use to improve decisionmaking is to appoint a devil’s advocate.

Keywords: experts; committees; career concerns; verifiable information; information aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sequential aggregation of verifiable information (2011)
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