Equilibrium Delay and Non-existence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games
Volker Britz (),
P. Jean-Jacques Herings and
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Volker Britz: ETH Zurich, Switzerland
No 14/196, CER-ETH Economics working paper series from CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich
We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by the current state and the identity of the player who rejected the current proposal. This protocol encompasses a vast number of special cases studied in the literature. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies need not exist. When such equilibria do exist, they may exhibit delay. Limit equilibria (as the players become infinitely patient) need not be unique.
Keywords: Strategic Bargaining; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Stationary Strategies; Nash Bargaining Solution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Equilibrium delay and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eth:wpswif:14-196
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