Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: A Devil's Menu and the Market for Lemons

Hans Gersbach (), Akaki Mamageishvili () and Oriol Tejada ()
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Hans Gersbach: ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Akaki Mamageishvili: ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Oriol Tejada: ETH Zurich, Switzerland

No 17/283, CER-ETH Economics working paper series from CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich

Abstract: Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but otherwise they are indistinguishable from real ballots. By means of a game-theoretical model, we show that decoy ballots may not provide e ective protection against a malevolent adversary trying to buy real ballots. If the citizenry is divided into subgroups (or districts), the adversary can construct a so-called "Devil's Menu" consisting of several prices. In equilibrium, the adversary can buy the real ballots of any strict subset of districts at a price corresponding to the willingness to sell on the part of the citizens holding such ballots. By contrast, decoy voters are trapped into selling their ballots at a low, or even negligible, price. Blowing up the adversary's budget by introducing decoy ballots may thus turn out to be futile. The Devil's Menu can also be applied to the well-known "Lemons Problem".

Keywords: voting; decoy votes; adversary; electronic voting; attacks; lemons market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D4 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2017-12
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