The Political Economy of Negotiating International Carbon Markets
Maria Arvaniti () and
Wolfgang Habla ()
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Maria Arvaniti: Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH), ETH Zurich, Switzerland
No 20/335, CER-ETH Economics working paper series from CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich
International carbon markets are frequently propagated as an efficient instrument for reducing CO2 emissions. We argue that such markets, despite their desirable efficiency properties, might not be in the best interest of governments who are guided by strategic considerations in negotiations. We identify the circumstances under which governments benefit or are harmed by cooperation in the form of an international market. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom that an international market is most beneficial for participating countries when they have vastly diverging marginal abatement costs; rather, it may be more promising to negotiate agreements with non-tradable emissions caps.
Keywords: cooperative climate policy; political economy; emissions trading; linking of permit markets; strategic delegation; strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H23 H41 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
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Working Paper: The political economy of negotiating international carbon markets (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eth:wpswif:20-335
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