Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms

David Bounie (), Antoine Dubus () and Patrick Waelbroeck
Additional contact information
David Bounie: i3, CNRS, Télécom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris
Antoine Dubus: Department of Management, Technology and Economics, ETH Zurich Leonhardstrasse 21 Switzerland – 8092 Zurich, Switzerland

No 22/367, CER-ETH Economics working paper series from CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich

Abstract: A monopolist data intermediary collects consumer information that it strategically sells to competing firms in a product market for price discrimination purposes. The intermediary charges a price of information and chooses the optimal partition that maximizes the willingness to pay of firms for information. Different selling mechanisms are compared: list prices, sequential bargaining, and auctions. The intermediary optimally sells information through auctions, whereas consumer surplus is maximized with sequential bargaining and list prices. We discuss the regulatory implications of our results.

Keywords: Selling mechanisms; Market for information; Data intermediaries; Competition policy; Regulation of digital markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms (2020)
Working Paper: Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eth:wpswif:22-367

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