Disagreement Aversion

Antoine Bommier (), Adrien Fabre, Arnaud Goussebaïle () and Daniel Heyen ()
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Antoine Bommier: Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH), ETH Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 18, 8032 Zürich, Switzerland
Arnaud Goussebaïle: Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH), ETH Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 18, 8032 Zürich, Switzerland
Daniel Heyen: University of Kaiserslautern and ETH Zürich
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arnaud Goussebaïle

No 22/370, CER-ETH Economics working paper series from CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich

Abstract: Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may be averse to such expert disagreement. Existing models of aversion to expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notion of disagreement aversion to distinguish spurious from genuine unanimity and develop a model that can capture disagreement aversion in our sense. The central element of our model is the cautious aggregation of experts’ beliefs.

Keywords: Disagreement Aversion; Ambiguity Aversion; Belief Aggregation; Decision under Uncertainty; Precautionary Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-mic and nep-upt
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