The Structure of Enterprise Law: Interrelationships among contracts, markets, and laws in the bargaining structure of the firm

Zenichi Shishido

Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)

Abstract: The firm is an ongoing joint project requiring both financial and human capital. Like other joint projects, the firm cannot maximize added value without achieving an efficient incentive bargain among the indispensable capital providers, i.e., shareholders and creditors as the monetary capital providers, and management and employees as the human capital providers. To stimulate efficient incentive bargaining at the firm level and, consequently, to enhance the efficiency of the whole economy, I will propose a new concept, the "enterprise law," and define it as any law which will affect the incentive bargaining of the firm. We will draw the whole picture of incentive bargaining at the firm by focusing on the interrelationships and complementarities among contracts, markets, and laws; thereafter we will present some legislative policy implications.

Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-ppm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/10e063.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eti:dpaper:10063

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by TANIMOTO, Toko ().