Political Connections and Antidumping Investigations: Evidence from China
Hongyong Zhang ()
Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)
Do political connections affect antidumping (AD) investigations? To address this question, we use antidumping filings data combined with micro data on Chinese manufacturing firms for the period 1998-2007. The political connections of a firm are defined by whether it has state-owned capital or whether it is under the administration of central or provincial government. Estimating a probit model of AD filings at the firm level, we find that strong political connections significantly increase the likelihood of AD petitions and affirmative final dumping decisions. State-owned enterprises, firms affiliated with the central or provincial government, low productivity firms, and large firms tend to file AD investigations in China. The industry-level estimation results also confirm that industries with a greater presence of state-owned enterprises are likely to receive trade protection from the Chinese government, controlling for import penetration, year, and industry fixed effects.
Pages: 15 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cna, nep-cse, nep-int, nep-pol and nep-tra
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Journal Article: Political connections and antidumping investigations: Evidence from China (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eti:dpaper:17092
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