Segregation and Public Spending under Social Identification
Yasuhiro Sato and
Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)
We investigate the relationship between segregation and public spending from the viewpoint of theory on social identification by developing a model wherein ethnic minority assimilation and public goods provision are both endogenous. We first show the possibility of multiple equilibria with respect to assimilation: in one equilibrium, individuals belonging to minorities choose to assimilate into the majority society whereas in the other, they reject assimilation, resulting in segregation. We then show that the government's public spending is smaller in the latter equilibrium than in the former one, which is consistent with the empirical finding that segregation decreases public spending. We further examine how changes in the government's objectives affect the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Pages: 22 pages
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Working Paper: Segregation and Public Spending under Social Identification (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eti:dpaper:19096
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