Data Sharing and Revenue Distribution Rule
Ryo Ishida () and
Masaya Yasuoka ()
Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)
The main purpose of this paper is to set a model in which there exist multiple firms producing data in a situation where each firm produces data and shares it voluntarily for new additional revenue. The model is used for theoretical examination of the revenue distribution rule and behaviors to maximize the social welfare. Consequently, the following three main results can be obtained. First, if the number of firms is sufficiently large and some conditions are assumed, the revenue distribution rule to maximize social welfare in a decentralized economy coincides with the elasticity of additional revenue with respect to the provided data. Second, if each firm maximizes profit in the decentralized economy, the firm can achieve allocations to maximize social welfare in a command optimum for any revenue distribution rule as long as the government provides the policy of lump-sum tax and subsidy appropriately. Third, if the subsidy for data sharing is financed by a flat rate tax for additional profit, each firm has an incentive to participate in the platform irrespective of the subsidy rate and revenue distribution rule.
Pages: 14 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eti:dpaper:20015
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by TANIMOTO, Toko ().