Reciprocal Altruism and Pension System in Overlapping Generations Models
Kirill Borissov () and
Alexander Surkov ()
No 2008/01, EUSP Department of Economics Working Paper Series from European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics
We analyze equilibrium paths in two models of overlapping generations with reciprocal altruism. The first one allows us to consider a case of different propensity to of consumer to support her children and parents (non-symmetrical altruism). In this model, an equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. The second model describes a case equivalent to a situation, when two succeeding generations (not working parents and working children) have common budget. (In Russian).
Keywords: economic growth; overlapping generations; pension; social security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 E24 H55 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2008-11-16, Revised 2008-12-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eus:wpaper:ec2008_01
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