Public Goods, Voting, and Growth
Joseph Hanna () and
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Joseph Hanna: Laboratoire IDP, Universite de Valenciennes et du Hainaut-Cambresis
No 2014/01, EUSP Department of Economics Working Paper Series from European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics
We study a parametric politico-economic model of economic growth with productive public goods and public consumption goods. The provision of public goods is funded by a proportional tax on consumers' income. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial capital endowments, discount factors and the relative weights of public consumption in overall private utility. They vote on the shares of public goods in GDP. We propose a definition of voting equilibrium, prove the existence and provide a characterization of voting equilibria, and obtain a closed-form solution for the voting outcomes.
Keywords: intertemporal choice; growth; public goods; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D91 H41 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
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Journal Article: Public goods, voting, and growth (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eus:wpaper:ec2014_01
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