Spielräume für uni- und multilateralen Klimaschutz

Wolfgang Buchholz (), Wolfgang Peters () and Aneta Ufert ()
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Wolfgang Peters: Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)

No 15, Discussion Paper Series RECAP15 from RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)

Abstract: The failure of previous climate policy leads us back to the public good characteristic of climate protection. The first aim of this paper is to identify by a simple graphical representation of 2x2 games, the ranges of constellations between country-specific environmental benefits and abatement costs which entail the four relevant games: prisoners’ dilemma, chicken game, stag hunt game and harmony game. Moreover, we examine how fairness preferences and especially reciprocity change these ranges. In contrast to the hypothesis that fairness motivations will foster cooperation we show that reciprocity reduces the scope for unilateral climate protection. In a third step, we consider reciprocal subsidies of abatement efforts, which definitely increase the scope for successful climate protection without requiring contractual mitigation obligations.

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-ger and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:euv:dpaper:15

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