Experimental investigations of coordination games: high success rates, invariant behavior, and surprising dynamics
Jörg Spiller () and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Reimund Schwarze
No 28, Discussion Paper Series RECAP15 from RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)
Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games are central for understanding cooperation and coordination. In the face of their tremendous number of completely different equilibria theoretical predictions about behavior in these games are extremely difficult. In our experiments, four players contribute or not to the production of a public good which is produced if at least k players contribute. The game with k=4 is the Stag Hunt game, k=1 is the Volunteer’s Dilemma. We investigate 16 different games with k=1,2,3,4. The regularities derived from these extensive variations (e.g. invariance concerning positive vs. negative frames and scaling of players; monotonicity concerning k and costs of contribution) can serve as the basis of a behavioral theory for BTPG games and beyond.
Keywords: Binary Threshold Public Goods; framing; equilibrium selection; payoff dominance; risk dominance; efficiency; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:euv:dpaper:28
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