Intergenerational Conflicts and the Resource Policy Formation of a Short-Lived Government

Uk Hwang () and Francesco Magris
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Uk Hwang: University of Cambridge

No 04-16, Documents de recherche from Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne

Abstract: This paper studies the political economy of resource management in an OLG framework with an intertemporal externality problem. The externality arises because a common resource used for production is depleted by production of dirty goods. An intergenerational conflict arises because the young generation cares about the level of current production of dirty goods. This is so because production of dirty goods affects the future availability of the resource. The old, on the other hand, has no such a concern. We assume that they lobby the government to affect the policy choice - an upper limit on the resource use allowed for production of dirty goods - in their favour. Within a dynamic common agency framework, we study stationary equilibria focussing on a particular class of strategies which we called "Take It or Leave It" (TIOLI) strategies, where a lobby makes a positive contribution only when her payoff maximising pol- icy is implemented. It is shown that political competition may lead to a "greener" environment policy and to less resource exploitation than in an unregulated economy. More surprisingly, we also find that resource ex- ploitation may be lower in political equilibrium than in an economy run by a social planner.

Keywords: dynamic common agency; effciency; externalities; political competition; resource policy design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D90 H23 L51 Q20 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2004
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Journal Article: Intergenerational Conflicts and the Resource Policy Formation of a Short-Lived Government (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eve:wpaper:04-16

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