International Borrowing without Commitment and Informational Lags: Choice under Uncertainty
Giorgio Fabbri
No 14-10, Documents de recherche from Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne
Abstract:
A series of recent studies in economic growth theory have considered a class of models of international borrowing where, in the absence of a perfect investment commitment, the borrowing constraint depends on the historical performances of the country. Thus, a better level of past economic activity gives a higher reputation, thereby increasing the possibility of accessing the international credit market. This note considers this problem in a stochastic setting based on the volatility of the internal net capital. We study how the optimal consumption level and the maximal expected welfare depend on the combined influence of the trajectory of past economic variables and the volatile environment. In particular, we show how the strength of the history effect and the relative weight of the historical performance depend on the degree of risk.
Keywords: Infinite dimensional dynamic programming; international borrowing; neutral stochastic differential equation; stochastic growth model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 F34 F43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-opm and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.univ-evry.fr/fileadmin/mediatheque/uev ... es/Epee/wp/14-10.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: International borrowing without commitment and informational lags: Choice under uncertainty (2017) 
Working Paper: International borrowing without commitment and informational lags: Choice under uncertainty (2017) 
Working Paper: International Borrowing Without Commitment and Informational Lags: Choice under Uncertainty (2015) 
Working Paper: International Borrowing Without Commitment and Informational Lags: Choice under Uncertainty (2015) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eve:wpaper:14-10
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Documents de recherche from Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Samuel Nosel ().