The effect of recycling over a mining oligopoly: competition for market shares, collusion for market power within a Cournot-Stackelberg model

Sylvain Sourisseau (), Jean De Beir () and Thai Ha Huy ()
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Sylvain Sourisseau: ADEME - French Agency of Environment and Energy Management, University of Paris Saclay - Evry Val d’Essonne
Jean De Beir: University of Paris Saclay - Evry Val d’Essonne, TEPP-CNRS, Department of Economics
Thai Ha Huy: University of Paris Saclay - Evry Val d’Essonne, Thang Long University, TIMAS
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thai Ha-Huy

No 19-01, Documents de recherche from Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne

Abstract: In this paper we show that the mining oligopoly face a trade-off between market share and market power. Its dominant position can still holds with a higher number of firms, but at a cost of a lower market power. Unexpectedly, we also found conditions under which the latter can be greater independently of strategic considerations. Assuming a better recycling efficiency and availability of scrap in the long run, the firms might undertake a vertical or horizontal integration to keep providing inputs to the downstream industry. Regarding recyclers, a technology threshold is required to enter the market. In terms of competition, we show that a very high level of technology and availability of scrap have to be simultaneously reached to hope for dominating the material supply

Keywords: oligopoly; market power; recycling; raw materials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2019
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