A single minded European representation? From illusion and delusion to reality of a European single seat

Miguel Rocha de Sousa

Economics Working Papers from University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal)

Abstract: We justify why a single seat from European members in international fora might be preferable than a multitude of seats. Leech and Leech (2005), Eichengreen (2008) proposed this reform at the IMF. Why? Even though nowadays European Union has an aggregate voting power that is higher than its? respective (expected) share in world output or population weight; If the single seat is obtained, more coordinated expected outcomes can be achieved. This line of reasoning is compatible with the single mindedness theory created by Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin and further extended by Canegrati. Focusing in one policy gives more political power for the single European seat.

Keywords: Coordination; EU; International Organizations Reform; IMF; Political economy models; Single European seat; Single mindedness theory; Voting power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 D78 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:evo:wpecon:2_2010

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