On some of the consequences of being possible to call early elections

António Caleiro

Economics Working Papers from University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal)

Abstract: This note presents some of the consequences due to the possibility of having early elections. First of all, elections, whether exogenously or endogenously determined, are relevant to challenge the well known neutrality principle of economic policies under rational expectations. Furthermore, in the particular case of being possible to admit early elections, the electoral advantages of right-wing parties in relation to left-wing parties suffer a diminishment.

Keywords: Early Elections; Median Voter; Partisan Policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E52 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10174/8418 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:evo:wpecon:4_2005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Maria Aurora Murcho Galego (agalego@uevora.pt).