Cooperative games with size-truncated

Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz

No 2013/301, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for nonconsecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Keywords: Cooperative game; core; Weber set; marginal worth vectors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2013
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