One-seller assignment markets with multiunit demands

Francisco Robles () and Marina Núñez ()
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Francisco Robles: Facultat d'Economia i Empresa; Universitat de Barcelona (UB)

No 2014/316, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands and prove that the associated game is buyers-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation where every buyer receives his marginal contribution. We prove that in this kind of market, every pairwise-stable outcome is associated to a competitive equilibrium and vice versa. We study conditions under which the buyers-optimal and the seller-optimal core allocations are competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. Moreover, we characterize the markets for which the core coincidences with the set of competitive equilibria payoff vectors. When agents behave strategically, we introduce a procedure that implements the buyers-optimal core allocation as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.

Keywords: Many-to-many assignment markets; Core; Pairwise-stability; Competitive equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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