Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions in Simple Games with Externalities Abstract: We propose a generalization of simple games to situations with coalitional externalities. The main novelty of our generalization is a monotonicity property that we define for games in partition function form. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on these kind of coalitions. We provide methods based on the multilinear extension of the game to compute the indices. Finally, the new indices are used to study the distribution of power in the current Parliament of Andalusia
José María Alonso-Meijide (),
Mikel Álvarez-Mozos and
María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro ()
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José María Alonso-Meijide: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo
No 2015/328, UB Economics Working Papers from Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB School of Economics
Keywords: Deegan-Packel Index; Public Good Index; Simple Games; Partition Function Form; Monotonicity; Multilinear Extension. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ewp:wpaper:328web
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