Gender differences and stereotypes in strategic thinking
Maria Cubel and
Santiago Sánchez-Pagés ()
No 2016/338, UB Economics Working Papers from Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB Economics
Recent literature has emphasized that individuals display varying levels of strategic reasoning. This paper presents ten years worth of experimental data from two countries exploring the existence and endogeneity of gender differences in strategic sophistication. We report results from two experimental studies employing the beauty contest game, one from the classroom and one from the laboratory. We observe robust and signi?cant gender differences in strategic sophistication in favour of men in zero-stake situations. These differences disappear when a monetary prize is awarded. We also ?find that depth of strategic reasoning varies with gender priming. Females display signi?cantly higher levels of strategic sophistication than males when gender is made salient. This effect of gender priming is driven by females who believe women are superior in the game.
Keywords: guessing game; strategic sophistication; gender; stereotype threat; beliefs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D81 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-dem, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ewp:wpaper:338web
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