Decentralized rationing problems

Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar () and Pere Timoner Lledó ()
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Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar: Universitat de Barcelona
Pere Timoner Lledó: Universitat de Barcelona

No 2016/345, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Decentralized rationing problems are those in which the resource is not directly assigned to agents, but first allocated to groups of agents and then divided among their members. Within this framework, we define extensions of the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses and the proportional rules. We show that the first two rules do not preserve certain essential properties and prove the conditions under which both rules do preserve those properties. We characterize the extension of the proportional rule as the only solution that satisfies individual equal treatment of equals. We prove that the proportional rule is the only solution that assigns the same allocation regardless of whether the resource is distributed directly to agents or in a decentralized manner (with agents grouped). Finally, we analyse a strategic game based on decentralized rationing problems in which agents can move freely across groups to submit their claims.

Keywords: Strategic rationing; decentralized rationing; equal awards rule; equallosses rule; proportional rule; a priori unions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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