Constrained multi-issue rationing problems
Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar () and
Pere Timoner Lledó ()
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Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar: Universitat de Barcelona
Pere Timoner Lledó: Universitat de Barcelona
No 2016/347, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics
Abstract:
We study a variant of the multi-issue rationing model, where agents claim for several issues. In this variant, the available amount of resource intended for each issue is constrained to an amount fixed a priori according to exogenous criteria. The aim is to distribute the amount corresponding to each issue taking into account the allocation for the rest of issues (issue-allocation interdependence). We name these problems constrained multi-issue allocation situations (CMIA). In order to tackle the solution to these problems, we first reinterpret some single-issue egalitarian rationing rules as a minimization program based on the idea of finding the feasible allocation as close as possible to a specific reference point. We extend this family of egalitarian rules to the CMIA framework. In particular, we extend the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule and the reverse Talmud rule to the multi-issue rationing setting, which turn out to be particular cases of a family of rules, namely the extended a-egalitarian family. This family is analysed and characterized by using consistency principles (over agents and over issues) and a property based on the Lorenz dominance criterion.
Keywords: rationing; multi-issue; reverse Talmud rule; equal losses rule; egalitarian family. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 68 pages
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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