Games with Graph Restricted Communication and Levels Structure of Cooperation
Oriol Tejada and
No 2017/363, UB Economics Working Papers from Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB School of Economics
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a communication graph and by a sequence of embedded partitions of the agent set. For this type of problem, we define and characterize two new values extending the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value respectively. Our results enable the axiomatic comparison between the two values and provide some basic insights for the analysis of fair resource allocation in nowadays fully integrated societies.
Keywords: Coalitional games; Restricted cooperation; Graph restricted communication; Levels structure; Shapley value; Banzhaf value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ewp:wpaper:363web
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