Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions

Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Carlos Rafels () and Neus Ybern ()
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Carlos Rafels: Universitat de Barcelona
Neus Ybern: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya

No 2018/376, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We analyze assortative assignment games, introduced in Becker (1973) and Eriksson et al. (2000). We study the extreme core points and show an easy way to compute them. We find a natural solution for these games. It coincides with several well-known point solutions, the median stable utility solution (Schwarz and Yenmez, 2011) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).We also analyze the behavior of the Shapley value. We finish with some extensions, where some hypotheses are relaxed.

Keywords: Assortative market; Assignment game; core; nucleolus. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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