The family of lattice structure values for games with externalities

José Mª Alonso-Meijide, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro Mª and Andrés Jiménez-Losada
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José Mª Alonso-Meijide: Universidade de Santaigo de Compostela
Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro Mª: Universidade de Vigo
Andrés Jiménez-Losada: Universidad de Sevilla

No 2018/379, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities. To define it we generalize the concept of marginal contribution by using a lattice structure on the set of embedded coalitions. The family of lattice structure values is characterized by extensions of Shapley's axioms: efficiency, additivity, symmetry, and the null player property. The first three axioms have widely accepted generalizations to the framework of games with externalities. However, different concepts of null players have been proposed in the literature and we contribute to this debate with a new one. The null player property that we use is weaker than the others. Finally, we present one particular value of the family, new in the literature, which delivers balanced payoffs and characterize it by two additional properties.

Keywords: Externalities; Partition function; Basis; Lattice; Marginal contribution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2018
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